On July 12, 1997, the majority of a Basque society anesthetized, self-conscious and fearful of terrorism finally understood what ETA was. At twenty minutes to five in the afternoon, in a field from Lasarte (Guipúzcoa), Francisco Javier García Gaztelu, Txapote, recovered with the trigger of his Beretta caliber 22, almost with a cannon shot, in the head of Miguel Ángel Blanco, City Council of the Popular Party in the City Council of Ermua. The victim, kidnapped 48 hours earlier, was on her knees, handcuffed and blindfolded. Hours later, at dawn, he died at the Hospital Nuestra Señora de Aránzazu; in reality, he had already been admitted clinically dead, although his heart was still beating. The other two members of the commando were Irantzu Gallastegui, Amaia, and José Luis Geresta Mújika, Oker. It was a cold execution, of unlimited cruelty, some of its details are better omitted 25 years later because they hurt the sensitivity of any human being. Miguel Ángel Blanco did not think that he was going to be killed when he was taken from the basement where he had been held captive for 48 hours. Txapote fired two shots, as has been said, because he wanted to ensure the death of the young councilman. He did not have much confidence in the weapon, because it had already failed before in the assassination attempt on a prison official starring, among others, Kepa Etxebarria. Social rebellion against ETA Neither the terrorist group nor its political arm knew how to gauge the response that a barbarity like this was going to cause. Miguel Ángel Blanco was approached by the terrorists shortly before 15.30:10 p.m. on July 1997, XNUMX, next to the Eibar train, just three kilometers from Ermua. With a degree in Business Sciences, he went to see a client of his company and did not show up in the city. Barely three hours later, the Security Forces, the Police, the Civil Guard and the Ertzaintza began a harrowing search. From the first minute the hopes of finding him alive were minimal. ETA gave a period of 48 hours for the Government of José María Aznar to regroup in the Basque Country to all its prisoners. If he did not agree, the victim would be killed. The gang knew that the Executive could not give in to blackmail, so that was not technically a "short kidnapping, but a long murder", as the then Secretary General of the Presidency, Javier Zarzalejos, once defined it. Impossible mission The use of the Security Forces was the greatest that was possible but some of the top managers of the device consulted by ABC assure that “it was impossible to find his whereabouts as a result of an investigation; the only possibility will be that a coincidence occurs, that someone had seen something strange and reported it or that the ETA members detected it in one of the most important roadblocks that were activated”. The 48 hours were worked tirelessly, all the confidants and all the wiretaps were activated, technological help was requested from the United States and all the possibilities to achieve the release were exhausted without, of course, giving in to terrorist blackmail, which I would have been suicidal. "The Ortega Lara operation had shown only a few days before that the police route was sufficient to put an end to ETA", insist the sources consulted, who assure that the only possible decision was adopted: not to give in. Justification The Egin headline after the crime: 'The Government did not move and ETA shot the PP councilor', transferred responsibility for what happened to the Executive Kepa Aulestia, in a newspaper article he wrote in El Correo about the murder at the hands of ETA of Dolores González Catarain, Yoyes, perpetrated years before that of the Biscayan councilman, spoke of that death “already sobering everything in evidence of the homicidal ingenuity in which a good part of Basque society was wrapped up. The faith in the bonhomie of those who wielded arms invites us to think that they would never do this or that thing»… Perhaps the analysis is also applicable, at least in part, to this case. Those who still saw a point in ETA, including a sector of nationalism, never thought that the gang could commit an atrocity of this nature. Neither the terrorist group, nor its political arm, supervised to gauge the magnitude of the social reaction that took place. The images of Miguel Ángel Blanco's parents, of his sister Marimar, of his girlfriend, caused an unprecedented impact. It is estimated that more than 5 million people mobilized on those days to ask for the victim's freedom, first, and to show their indignation at the murder, later. Two milestones: before the crime, Bilbao experienced the largest demonstration in its history, with more than half a million citizens; After the murder, in Madrid there was a similar situation, with 1,5 million people on the street. Turning point What attitude did nationalism have towards this savagery? Probably, since the first afternoon, when the residents of Ermua took to the streets en masse to ask for the councilman's freedom, this sector realized that she was not going to be just another victim, that there would be a before and after. The release of Ortega Lara was still very present, with those terrible images that spoke very clearly that there was no hint of humanity in ETA, and the kidnapping reinforced that feeling. Related News Standard interview Yes José María Aznar: "It is nonsense that Miguel Ángel Blanco is remembered by those who agree with his assassins" Pablo Muñoz The former Prime Minister: "They did not kill him for being someone who passed by, but a PP councilor , to defend freedom, democracy and the Spanish nation; don't forget” Xabier Arzalluz, president of the Basque Nationalist Party, did not want to believe at first in the authorship of ETA –again a homicidal naivety?– and even speculated that it was a work of the intelligence services. Egin, the gang's media arm, headlined the day after the murder: "The Government did not move and ETA shot the PP mayor." In his editorial he was extremely indignant at "the degree of insensitivity of those who put their illegal strategy, their constant mockery of the rights that correspond to 600 Basque citizens, above the lives of their colleagues." namely; For the pro-ETA members, the responsibility lay with the Government for not respecting the rights of the prisoners, while the only thing ETA asked for was compliance with the law. Therefore, according to the diabolical analysis, strictly speaking one could not speak of extortion of the Executive. Nationalist reaction The PNV went to Estella out of fear of the spirit of Ermua, the nationalist pressure and the end of ETA's 'temperature taking', which made so much money On July 16, four days after the heinous crime, Herri Batasuna, who had seen losing what was safest for him, which was control of the street, he returned to the fray with a statement: "We are not happy about this or any other death," he said, to add: "We cannot forget the intransigence and the closure of the Spanish Government presided over by Aznar in the face of the clamor of Basque society that demanded the repatriation of Basque political prisoners”. And they ended with a warning: “The strategy of lynching and hunting the pro-independence militant or sympathizer encouraged by the political forces and the media is not going to solve the problem and will mean, instead, a dangerous aggravation of it”… Related News standard No El Rey, in Ermua: "We cannot allow generations to ignore what happened" M. Villamediana “We ask that our voice not be silenced. Only some were killed and only others died”, assured the sister of the murdered councillor. In a speech at the Manuel Giménez Abad Foundation, Javier Zarzalejos reflected on this matter: “The Government did not negotiate what ETA itself made non-negotiable. I can assure you that it was not an easy decision. But in it the conviction of the firmness with which the fight against terrorism had to be conducted and the example of a family that included what the Government was doing and why it was doing it converged. “Humiliate the Government” “Because the alternative – added the former Secretary General of the Presidency – was not either to negotiate with ETA or for ETA to assassinate Miguel Ángel. No usual alternative. ETA wanted to kill Miguel Ángel Blanco, and furthermore, humiliate the Government to politically incapacitate him for the rest of the legislature in regard to the fight against terrorism”. The announcement of any negotiation would have sent ETA the sign of weakness that it sought to detect in the Government in order to, first, assassinate Miguel Ángel Blanco, and also exploit that vulnerability. A year after the assassination, the PNV reached an agreement with ETA/Batasuna in Estella. Of course, because he perceived Ermua's spirit as a threat.
